1. Field
This invention relates generally to systems for enhancing global positioning system performance.
2. Background
GPS, or Global Positioning System, is funded by and controlled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). While there are many thousands of civil users of GPS world-wide, the system was designed for and is operated by the U.S. military. GPS provides specially coded satellite signals that can be processed in a GPS receiver, enabling the receiver to compute position, velocity, and time. Four GPS satellite signals are used to compute positions in three dimensions and the time offset in the receiver clock.
The GPS satellites transmit two microwave carrier signals. The L1 frequency (1575.42 MHz) carries the navigation message and the Satellite Positioning Service (SPS) code signals. The L2 frequency (1227.60 MHz) is used to measure the ionospheric delay by Precise Positioning System (PPS) equipped receivers.
Three binary codes shift the L1 or L2 carrier phase. The C/A Code (Coarse Acquisition) modulates the L1 carrier phase. The C/A code is a repeating 1 MHz Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) Code. This code modulates the L1 carrier signal, spreading the spectrum over a 1 MHz bandwidth. The C/A code repeats every 1023 bits (one millisecond). Each satellite has a different PRN C/A code, and GPS satellites are often identified by their PRN number, the unique identifier for each pseudo-random-noise code. The C/A code that modulates the L1 carrier is the basis for the civil SPS.
Authorized users with cryptographic equipment and keys and specially equipped receivers use the Precise Positioning System, or PPS. Authorized users include U.S. and allied military, certain U.S. Government agencies, and selected civil users specifically approved by the U.S. Government. In the PPS, the P-Code (Precise) modulates both the L1 and L2 carrier phases. The P-Code is a very long (seven days) 10 MHz PRN code. In the Anti-Spoofing (AS) mode of operation, the P-Code is encrypted into the Y-Code. The encrypted Y-Code requires a classified AS Module for each receiver channel and is for use only by authorized users with cryptographic keys. The P/Y Code is the basis for the PPS.
A Navigation Message also modulates the L1-C/A code signal. The Navigation Message is a 50 Hz signal consisting of data bits that describe the GPS satellite orbits, clock corrections, and other system parameters. The GPS Navigation Message consists of time-tagged data bits marking the time of transmission of each subframe at the time they are transmitted by the SV. A data bit frame consists of 1500 bits divided into five 300-bit subframes. A data frame is transmitted every thirty seconds. Three six-second subframes contain orbital and clock data. Satellite Vehicle (SV) Clock corrections are sent in subframe one and precise satellite orbital data sets (ephemeris data parameters) for the transmitting SV are sent in subframes two and three. Subframes four and five are used to transmit different pages of system data. An entire set of twenty-five frames (125 subframes) makes up the complete Navigation Message that is sent over a 12.5 minute period.
Ephemeris data parameters describe SV orbits for short sections of the satellite orbits. Normally, a receiver gathers new ephemeris data each hour, but can use old data for up to four hours without much error. The ephemeris parameters are used with an algorithm that computes the SV position for any time within the period of the orbit described by the ephemeris parameter set.
The C/A code is broadcast at 1,575.42 MHz in a 2.046 MHz wide band (complete null to null), and is used for civilian operations and for initial acquisition in military operations. The P/Y code is a wider-band signal spanning 20.46 MHz that provides 10 times higher ranging precision than C/A code commensurate with its higher chipping rate. Often, C/A code is the first casualty of jamming. The 1.023 MHz chipping rate of the C/A code provides some protection, but the 10.23 MHz chipping rate of the P/Y code offers an additional 10 dB of J/S protection. If the jamming is known to be narrow band and to originate within the C/A code frequency band so as to deny enemy use of the C/A code signal component, then even more protection is available by notch filtering the center 2 MHz of the P/Y code input to the receiver.
The ability to track low power GPS signals is important for a number of real-time applications, including cases where the GPS signal may be attenuated, jammed, or subject to interference. Previous approaches to these obstacles have included to varying degrees (i) signal processing to enhance sensitivity, (ii) controlled radiation pattern antennas (CRPAs) to thwart jamming, and (iii) control of the receiving environment, if possible, to ward off interference. Unfortunately, in many of these cases, only limited performance improvement is feasible due to practical constraints.
In the case of (i) signal processing, the fundamental limit to increased performance is established by the data bit boundaries in the GPS message. The intrinsic GPS data broadcast rate is 50 bits per second. Ordinary receivers cannot integrate the signal across these 20 ms intervals. Extension of the integration interval would actually lead to a decrease in performance because the data bits will appear as random noise that averages to zero. Therefore, a general practical limit is 20 ms averaging.
Some practitioners have tried to push this limit by squaring the GPS signal. However, squaring is an inefficient means of recovering information because the noise is mixed with itself, resulting with a significant baseband noise component superimposed over the squared signal at baseband. Other techniques have been devised that employ data stripping—the local application of limited a priori knowledge of the GPS bit sequence that takes advantage of a tendency in GPS to often repeat the same sequence multiple times—in order to remove the GPS data and obtain longer integration times. Unfortunately, this technique can often provide marginal results—especially in critical applications. The main shortcoming is that it completely falls apart when the GPS message changes, and this occurrence is frequent and unpredictable.
Prior processing efforts have also taught away from the current invention of employing feed-forward data to enhance performance. For example, U.S. Pat. No. 6,133,874 teaches that, “Coherent integration beyond 20 milliseconds is normally inadvisable since the presence of a priori unknown 50 baud binary phase shift keyed data (the satellite data message) placed on top of the signal does not allow coherent processing gain beyond one data bit period, or 20 milliseconds.” Similarly, U.S. Pat. No. 5,664,734 explains, “If the carrier frequency and all data rates were known to great precision, and no data were present, then the signal-to-noise ratio could be greatly improved, and the data greatly reduced, by adding to one another successive frames. The presence of 50 baud data superimposed on the GPS signal still limits the coherent summation of PN frames beyond a period of 20 msec.”
Null steering antennas (ii) reduce jamming by identifying the direction of origin of a jammer, then spatially notching out all signals in that direction. What remains is the unjammed GPS signals that come from other directions. With additional phased array electronics, it is also possible to create more tightly focused beams on individual GPS satellites, thereby increasing signal strength. While the jamming protection of CRPAs is excellent, such antennas are often heavy, bulky, and expensive.
Last, controlling the receiving environment to minimize interference sources (iii) is often involved because it must be carried out under a regulatory regime. For example, ultrawideband (UWB) devices have already been shown to interfere with certain GPS devices on occasion. There is a general desire to have both of these devices coexist—the potential user base is fundamentally the same. In the best of all worlds, a regulatory environment will exist that will enable UWB to coexist with GPS and other incumbent bands. However, in spite of best efforts to create and conform to such a regulatory environment, there will always be deviations that create exceptions to proper performance. It is for these cases that the invention described herein is likely to be most useful, namely, as a “safety net” against unexpected interference.
What is needed is a system that provides robust GPS performance under any of these adverse conditions with a simple solution that does not incur the associated penalties in terms of size, weight, power, and cost.